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PUBLIC OUTCRY V. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS:
RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE DRUNK
DRIVER'S DILEMMA
I. INTRODUCTION
Public outcry: "Drunk driving has been a national
epidemic and a disgrace long enough!"1
V.
Individual "IT]he accused shall enjoy the right...
rights: to have the Assistance of Counsel
... ."'before submitting to a sobriety test.
Although drunk driving has taken thousands of lives in
the past decade, serious attention to this problem was almost
non-existent until recently.' Disturbed by the problem of the
drinking driver, states have pursued more effective means of
apprehending and prosecuting offenders.4 As a result of this
public outcry, implied consent statutes have been employed in
all fifty states and the District of Columbia.5 While these stat-
utes serve the legitimate public policy of convicting drunken
1. This is the feeling of a growing number of politicians, judges, and citizens who
are advocating new programs to address a problem that takes 25,000 lives a year.
Quade, War on Drunk Driving: 25,000 Lives at Stake, 68 A.B.A. J. 1551 (1982).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. Quade, supra note 1, at 1551.
4. See LerbIance, Implied Consent to Intoxication Tests: A Flawed Concept, 53 ST.
JOHN'S L. Rv. 39 (1978).
5. See Lerblance, supra note 4, at 39. For a discussion of one such statute, see
Comment, Florida's "Implied Consent" Statute: Chemical Tests for Intoxicated Drivers,
22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 698 (1968).
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
drivers,6 it is questionable, under current law, whether the
rights of the accused are being adequately protected.7
Persons arrested for driving while under the influence of
alcohol (DWI)8 are requested to submit to a chemical sobriety
test9 to determine the level of intoxication. Implied consent
statutes provide that the accused may refuse the test. Upon
refusal, however, the accused's driver's license may be re-
voked or suspended for some prescribed period of time.10
Thus, the accused faces a difficult decision which bears signifi-
cant consequences. Under the current case law, the courts
are split as to whether the accused is entitled to make this
decision with the advice of counsel. This comment examines
the applicable case law, balances the accused's constitutional
rights with society's need to deter drunk drivers, and con-
cludes that, due to the serious consequences that may result
6. The immediate purpose of the implied consent statute is to obtain the best evi-
dence of the driver's blood alcohol content at the time of the arrest; the long range
purpose is to prevent intoxicated individuals from driving on the highways. Collins v.
Secretary of State, 384 Mich. 656, ., 187 N.W.2d 423, 429 (1971).
The process is completed if a driver complies with the officer's initial request for a
chemical test, even though the driver may never have been advised of anything. The
purpose of the statute is to provide an effective means, short of physical force, to over-
come the driver's refusal. The nonphysical means consist of a penalty, such as an exten-
sive suspension of the driver's license (see infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text),
and a warning that the driver's license will be suspended if he or she continues to refuse.
Therefore, the consent envisioned by the statute is to be implied and if submission is not
forthcoming it is to be coerced through fear of adverse consequences. See State v.
Newton, 291 Or. 788, _, 636 P.2d 393, 401-02 (1981) (discussing Oregon's implied
consent statute: OR. REv. STAT. § 487.805(2), which is currently found in OR. R V.
STAT. § 813.100 (1985).
7. The courts of many states have addressed the issue of whether a person accused
of driving while intoxicated has a right to consult with counsel prior to exercising or
waiving the right to refuse the chemical sobriety test. A number of them, including
Arizona, Georgia, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Oregon, New Hampshire and Rhode Island,
have concluded that no such right to counsel exists. Others, including Missouri, North
Carolina, New York, Ohio and Washington, have upheld the right to counsel. See gen-
erally Annot., 18 A.L.R.4TH 705 (1982).
8. This comment uses the abbreviation of "DWI" to refer to the offense of driving
while under the influence of alcohol. The terminology of drunk driving offenses may
vary from state to state. For example, some states abbreviate the offense as "OWI" for
operating a vehicle while intoxicated.
9. Normally, the accused has a choice between a breathalyzer test or a blood test to
determine the level of alcohol in the body. See supra notes 4-5.
10. Most statutes suspend the license from 90 days to one year. See infra notes 28-
29 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
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from either choice under the statute, a right to counsel should
be provided.
I. THE "CRITICAL STAGE" TEST
Some courts have held that a sixth amendment right to
counsel 12 does afford a person apprehended for drunk driving
a right to communicate with counsel before deciding whether
to take a chemical sobriety test. The results of the chemical
sobriety test, or the refusal to submit thereto, may give rise to
two proceedings. One proceeding is civil in nature, involving
the suspension of the operator's license; the other is criminal,
resulting in a criminal charge of operating a vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol. 13 This section discusses cases
involving a criminal penalty where the courts have held that a
sixth amendment right to counsel14 does afford a person ap-
prehended for drunk driving a right to communicate with
counsel before deciding whether to take a chemical sobriety
test.
Since 1932, the United States Supreme Court has held that
the scope of the pretrial right to counsel is to be based on the
protection of the accused's sixth amendment right to counsel
at trial. If the right to counsel is not provided at a "critical"
pretrial stage,15 the accused's right to counsel may be rendered
meaningless. 16  The Court has subsequently extended the
"critical stage" test to all state criminal proceedings, whether
serious or petty.17 There are different points in time in the
procedural process which have been identified as a "critical
stage."' 18 The leading case in this area is United States v.
12. The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution has been extended to
the states via the fourteenth amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
13. Annot., 18 A.L.R.4T 705, 708 (1982) and supplementary cases.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VI states in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to . . .have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
15. The Supreme Court presented a conceptual definition of what constitutes a
"critical stage" in United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973); Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25 (1972); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970).
16. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932).
17. See, e.g., Argersinger, 407 U.S. 25.
18. The Court has established that sentencing and the first appeal granted as a
matter of right are critical post-trial stages. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Similarly, the Court has held in-custody
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Wade. 19 There the Court stated the "critical stage" test as
follows:
[T]he accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone
against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or
informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might der-
ogate from the accused's right to a fair trial. The security of
that right is as much the aim of the right to counsel as it is of
the other guarantees of the Sixth Amendment .... 20
It is arguable that the pretest period is a "critical stage" of
the drunk driving prosecution in that the accused is required,
under the implied consent statute, to make a choice between
taking or not taking the test. This choice is one which will
have a substantial and irreversible impact on the subsequent
trial.21 The decision whether to take the test is a critical stage
because if the accused submits and is in fact intoxicated, the
chance of winning the criminal case is virtually nonexistent.22
Penalties for DWI convictions may include heavy fines or
imprisonment, revocation of the driver's license, and
mandatory sentences for subsequent offenses.23 If the defend-
ant refuses, loss of license ensues.24 Worse yet, many states
have statutes which allow a refusal to be introduced as evi-
dence in a criminal proceeding.25 This rule clearly mitigates
the advantage gained from refusal, especially by drivers who
interrogations, arraignments, and preliminary hearings to be critical pretrial stages. See
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
19. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
20. Id. at 226-27 (footnote omitted).
21. See Note, Driving While Intoxicated and the Right to Counsel: The Case
Against Implied Consent, 58 TEx. L. REy. 935, 951-52 (1980).
22. The Department of Transportation (DOT) Highway Safety Program Standard
No. 8 requires states to presume intoxication if the suspect's blood alcohol content is
0.10 percent or greater. See generally Comment, The Drinking Driver: An Approach to
Solving a Problem of Underestimated Severity, 14 VILL. L. Rv. 97, 104 (1968).
23. See, eg., CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23160-23165 (vest 1985).
24. See generally, Note, North Dakota Implied Consent: An Historical Overview
and Modern Adaptations, 58 N.D.L. Rv. 765 (1982).
25. See, e.g., 23 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1205 (1978 & Supp. 1985); see Campbell
v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685 (1971); State v. Durrant, 55 Del. 510,
188 A.2d 526 (1963); State v. Dugas, 252 La. 345, 211 So. 2d 285 (1968); State v.
Welch, 135 Vt. 316, 376 A.2d 351 (1977). See generally Young, Supreme Court Report,
69 A.B.A. J. 656, 658 (1983); Note, State v. Neville: The Giving of a Meaningful Choice
to the Accused, 27 S.D.L. REv. 300 (1982).
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would test below the level that establishes the presumption of
intoxication. 6
In addition to the risk that a refusal will be used as incul-
patory evidence, drivers face an additional burden-suspen-
sion of their driver's licenses. All of the implied consent
statutes27 provide that upon refusal the state shall suspend the
driver's license from as short as ninety days28 to as long as one
year.29 A police officer quickly and mechanically reading the
accused's rights cannot assist the accused in making this
choice.3 0
26. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
27. An example of a typical implied consent statute is Wis. STAT. § 343.305 (1983-
84):
(1) Any person who drives. . . a motor vehicle upon the public highways of
this state. . . shall be deemed to have given consent to one or more tests of his
or her breath, blood or urine, for the purpose of determining the presence or
quantity. . . of alcohol.
(3)(a) A law enforcement officer requesting a person to take a test. . . shall
inform the person:
(2) That if he or she refuses to submit to any such test his or her operating
privilege shall be revoked ....
(9)(a) If the court determines. . . that a person improperly refused to take a
test. . . the court shall proceed (to order] ....
2. [For the first improper refusal the court shall revoke the person's oper-
ating privilege for 6 months.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that there is no right to consult with counsel
before deciding whether to submit to a chemical test for intoxication. When a driver
receives a driver's license, it is taken subject to the legislatively imposed condition that
upon being arrested for driving under the influence of an intoxicant, the driver consents
to submit to the chemical tests. The license is taken subject to the condition that an
unreasonable refusal to submit to the tests will result in a revocation of the license.
Since a lawyer cannot induce a client to recant a consent previously given knowingly
and voluntarily, a lawyer can serve no purpose, consistent with the implied consent law,
by advising a client to submit to a chemical test or to refuse it. State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis.
2d 191, 289 N.W.2d 828 (1980).
28. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 32-5-192(c) (1975); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
6701-1-5 (2)(f) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
29. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.123 subd. 4 (West Supp. 1985); OR. REV.
STAT. § 813.420 (1985).
30. Miranda warnings are given at the time of arrest. It is only after the Miranda
warnings that the person is requested to submit to testing and the implied consent stat-
ute is read. It may be difficult for the driver to reconcile the apparent contraditions
between the Miranda warnings, which allow the right to counsel, and an implied con-
sent statute, which denies the driver the right to consult an attorney prior to making a
[Vol. 69:278
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The question is how can accused persons make an intelli-
gent decision regarding submission to a chemical sobriety test
if they are ignorant of their various rights? The officer is
under no duty to fully enlighten an accused.31 Clearly, the
answer is that only through the advice and counsel of an at-
torney32 can the accused be expected to make an intelligent
and knowledgable decision.33
The Washington Supreme Court in State v. Fitzsimmons34
made a strong case for a clear constitutional right to counsel.
In Fitzsimmons, the defendant was charged with DW135 and
was denied immediate access to counsel. The defendant re-
fused a breathalyzer test 36 and was subsequently convicted of
driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.37 The
Supreme Court of Washington reversed and held that crimi-
decision to submit to testing. Heles v. South Dakota, 530 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D. 1982),
vacated as moot, 682 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982).
31. Although an officer is required to advise the arrestee of the statutory conse-
quences of a refusal to take a chemical test, the officer is not required to advise the
arrestee of the effect on the criminal proceedings of either taking the test or refusing to
take it. See Siegwald v. Curry, 40 Ohio App. 2d 313, 316, 319 N.E.2d 381, 385 (1974).
32. Attorneys are under an ethical duty to provide legal assistance under these cir-
cumstances. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-1 (1984) ("A
basic tenet of the professional responsibility of lawyers is that every person in our soci-
ety should have ready access to the independent professional services of a lawyer of
integrity and competence.").
33. The defendant's constitutional rights to counsel do not depend on whether the
attorney is appointed or retained. In other words, the state is required to provide the
indigent access to appointed counsel in the same instances in which the solvent driver
charged with DWI is allowed to contact a privately retained attorney. State v. Fitzsim-
mons, 93 Wash. 2d 436, 610 P.2d 893 (1980) (en bane). See also Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Also, this requirement will not place an "additional burden on the arresting and
charging officer, who must simply provide any defendant with access to a telephone and
the number of a public defender organization or numbers of individuals willing to act as
counsel in this type of case." Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d at-, 610 P.2d at 899 (footnote
omitted).
34. 93 Wash. 2d 436, 610 P.2d 893 (1980) (en banc), vacated, 449 U.S. 977 (1980).
The case was remanded to the Washington Supreme Court to consider whether its
decison was based upon federal or state constitutional grounds, or both. On remand,
the Washington Supreme court held that although the constitutional analysis in the
Fitzsimmons opinion is "persuasive" in character, the state constitutional grounds is an
adequate and independent ground for the court's decision. State v. Fitzsimmons, 94
Wash. 2d 858, , 620 P.2d 999, 1000 (1980) (affirmed the opinion found at 93 Wash.2d
436, 610 P.2d 893 with no alterations or amendments).
35. See supra note 8.
36. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d at _ 610 P.2d at 896.
37. Id.
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nal proceedings were "initiated" when the officer cited the de-
fendant for DWI. The court further held that the period
immediately after the arrest and charge was a "critical stage"
at which time the right to counsel attached "because of the
unique character of the evidence to be obtained and the trial
strategy decisions which [had] to be made then, if at all."38
The court went on to discuss United States v. Ash,39 where the
United States Supreme Court held that the right to counsel
extended only to events during which "the accused required
aid in coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting his
adversary."'' The Fitzsimmons court held that the time im-
mediately following the arrest and the charging with DWI is
certainly the requisite critical event. At that point "[t]he de-
fendant is still in custody and must immediately make the de-
cision whether to submit to a breathalyzer, arrange for further
testing and observation of his mental state, or forever lose any
defense. ' 41 When the accused is confronted by the adversary,
meaningful assistance in the accused's defense is insured only
by acknowledging the right to counsel.
In Gerstein v. Pugh,42 the Court discussed the types of pre-
trial proceedings that constitute critical stages. "The Court
has identified as 'critical stages' those pretrial procedures that
would impair defense on the merits if the accused is required
to proceed without counsel." 43 One who has been accused of
DWI and asked to submit to a chemical sobriety test has cer-
tain rights. These rights are not cumulative; that is, the exer-
cise of one right may also operate as a relinquishment of
another. Thus, this point in time is a "critical stage" in the
proceedings because, if left unguided by counsel, the accused
may irretrievably lose important rights.' The possible conse-
quences of a driver's decision whether to submit to a chemical
38. Id. at _, 610 P.2d at 898.
39. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
40. Id. at 313.
41. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d at -, 610 P.2d at 898-99.
42. 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (a probable cause determination is nonadversarial and is
therefore not a "critical stage" warranting a right to counsel).
43. Id. at 122 (citations omitted).
44. For an explanation of the need for the "guiding hand of counsel" at every step
of the proceedings, see Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (arraignment is a
critical stage because defense of insanity must be pleaded or opportunity may be lost).
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test 5 clearly affects the merits of the defense, thereby making
the decision a critical stage according to the Court's reasoning
in Gerstein.
The critical stage concept was limited by the United States
Supreme Court in Kirby v. Illinois.4 6 The Court, in a plurality
opinion, held that the right to counsel does not attach until
the accused has been "formally" charged.47 This holding
presents a problem for the driver because the decision to com-
mence criminal rather than administrative proceedings is usu-
ally not made until after a breathalyzer test is refused or taken
and the result known.48 Hence, many courts, in reliance on
Kirby, have held that the right to counsel does not materialize
when the driver is arrested, but rather when the driver is in-
dicted or some other formal charge has been brought.49
45. Any evidence, notwithstanding how early it is gathered in the investigation or
prosecution, "may affect the ultimate adjudication and could therefore logically be re-
garded as a critical stage. A breathalyzer request and submission is such a process."
State v. Newton, 291 Or. 788, , 636 P.2d 393, 403 (1981) (en banc).
46. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
47. Justice Stewart stated that the right arose with "the initiation of adversary judi-
cial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, in-
dictment, information, or arraignment . . . . It is this point . . . that marks the
commencement of the 'criminal prosecutions' to which alone the explicit guarantees of
the Sixth Amendment are applicable." Id. at 689-90 (footnote omitted).
48. See Prideaux v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 310 Minn. 405, , 247 N.W.2d 385,
388-89 (1976).
Only after the driver makes his decision regarding the test does the proceeding
divide clearly into its civil and criminal aspects-civil, if testing is refused; crim-
inal, if testing is consented to; or both, if testing is refused, but the prosecutor
nonetheless has sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction and elects to do so.
Id. at 389.
Given these circumstances, there is no reason why evidence gathering for prosecu-
tion for DWI is any less subject to constitutional scrutiny than any other evidence gath-
ering procedures such as searches, use of informers, or custodial interrogation. Id.
Prideaux held that an accused has a right to counsel based upon Minnesota's general
statutory right to counsel. It is important to note that the Minnesota Supreme Court, in
light of a 1984 amendment, has recently ruled that a driver arrested for DWI no longer
has a limited statutory right to consult with counsel before deciding whether to submit
to chemical testing. Nyflot v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 369 N.W.2d 512, 515
(Minn. 1985) (1984 amendment to the implied consent advisory now allows the driver
the right to consult with an attorney after submitting to testing. Act of May 2, 1984,
ch. 622, § 10, 1984 Minn. Laws 1541, 1546-47).
49. See, eg., State ex rel. Webb v. City Court of Tucson, 25 Ariz. App. 214, 542
P.2d 407 (1975); State v. Bristor, 236 Kan. 313, 691 P.2d 1 (1984); State v. Petkus, 110
N.H. 394, 269 A.2d 123 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1971); State v. Newton, 291
Or. 788, 636 P.2d 393 (1981); State v. Wilhelm, 55 Or. App. 168, 637 P.2d 1294 (1981).
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However, the plurality opinion in Kirby dealt solely with
pretrial identification procedures and some courts have lim-
ited it to those situations.5 0 "Even if given a broader interpre-
tation, Kirby still adheres to the established position that it is
necessary in all cases to scrutinize any pretrial confrontation
to ensure the fairness of the procedures in light of an accused's
rights to due process of law." 51
The Court in Kirby held that the sixth amendment right to
counsel arises at the "initiation of adversary judicial criminal
proceedings. '52 It is at this point that the accused is con-
fronted with the prosecutorial forces of society.53 Arguably,
the criteria of Kirby are met when the police officer prepares a
complaint charging the arrestee with the specific crime of
DWI. Thus, adversary judicial criminal proceedings have
been commenced against the defendant. Clearly, the accused
is "faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society,
and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural
criminal law"54 when asked to consent to a chemical sobriety
test and when subsequently required to answer a charge in a
judicial court.55 Although the sixth amendment right to coun-
sel before submitting to a chemical sobriety test may appear
very compelling, recent Supreme Court decisions unfortu-
nately tend to weaken its forcefulness.5 6
50. A few courts have held that the sixth amendment right to counsel covers the
stage at which the accused must decide whether to submit to the chemical test. See,
e.g., Heles v. South Dakota, 530 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D. 1982), vacated as moot, 682 F.2d
201 (8th Cir. 1982) (failure to allow the accused an opportunity to contact an attorney
prior to testing would be inconsistent with the due process demands of the sixth and
fourteenth amendments); Forte v. State, 686 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (the stage
prior to testing is a "critical stage" of the pretrial proceeding); State v. Welch, 135 Vt.
316, 320, 376 A.2d 351, 354 (1977); (superseded by statutory right to counsel, see State
v. Duff, 136 Vt. 537, 394 A.2d 1145 (1978)); see Note, supra note 21, at 952 (the
Supreme Court has not clarified its position since Kirby, thereby making its application
to implied consent proceedings uncertain); see also supra notes 42-43 and accompanying
text.
51. Welch, 135 Vt. at 320, 376 A.2d at 354 (citations omitted). See also United
States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 320 (1973); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967);
Note, The Pretrial Right to Counsel, 26 STAN. L. REV. 399, 418 (1974); Note, The State
Responses to Kirby v. United States, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 423.
52. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d at -, 610 P.2d at 898.
56. The Kirby test has been applied in other circumstances and has been reaffirmed
by the Supreme Court in a number of later cases. See United States v. Gouveia, 467
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The constitutional right to counsel is violated when the
defendant is prohibited from contacting an attorney. Even so,
not every violation of a constitutional right is "prejudicial. '57
Some constitutional errors are deemed harmless when the
court can show that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.58
The essence of the "critical stage" test from Wade was
"[w]hether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's
rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of
counsel to help avoid that prejudice. '59 Applying this test to
the accused's situation leads one to conclude that the point in
time when an accused is requested to submit to a chemical
sobriety test is clearly a "critical stage" in the prosecution of a
U.S. 180 (1984); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387
(1977); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977).
The United States Supreme Court recently dismissed an appeal on whether a de-
fendant has a right to counsel before deciding whether to consent to a chemical test.
The appeal was dismissed for lack of a substantial federal question. However, Justices
White and Stevens dissented stating that in light of the varying results among the courts
which have considered this issue, they would note probable jurisdiction to settle this
issue. Nyflot v. Minnesota Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 106 S. Ct. 586 (1985) (White, J.,
Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). In Gilbert, the Court held that the
taking of handwriting exemplars was not a "critical stage" of the criminal proceedings
since there is minimal risk that the absence of counsel might derogate from defendant's
right to a fair trial.
A similar argument could be made that since a blood alcohol test is a scientifically
exact procedure, allowing little or no subjectivity, there is no need for an attorney to be
present at the administration of the test because any variation from established proce-
dures can be used to invalidate the test results when they are offered into evidence at
trial. Thus, the absence of counsel at the administration of a chemical sobriety test does
not pose a serious threat of prejudice to the substantial rights of the defendant.
However, the question of whether the accused has a right to the presence of an
attorney at the administration of the chemical sobriety test is a far different one than
whether the accused has a right to consult with an attorney before deciding whether to
submit to the test.
58. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); see also Note, Harmless Consti-
tutional Error: A Reappraisal, 83 HARV. L. REV. 814 (1970).
In deciding what constitutes harmless error, the Chapman Court said: "The ques-
tion is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might
have contributed to the conviction." Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 (citation omitted). Some
lawyers have argued that there is a reasonable possibility of harm resulting from the
temporary exclusion of defendant's counsel on the night of the arrest. An accused's
condition will not last. If one accused of driving while intoxicated is to have witnesses
for a defense, the accused must have access to counsel, friends, or some other persons
within a relatively short time after the arrest. State v. Hill, 277 N.C. 547, _ 178 S.E.2d
462, 466 (1971).
59. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
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DWI charge. The decision which is made will be crucial to
the accused's future handling of the charge. At that point,
rights may be gained or lost. Once lost, rights cannot be sal-
vaged and even those rights gained60 can also be lost by failing
to timely assert them. Thus, if counsel is not available to the
accused at that point, potential defenses may become irretriev-
able, even to the most skillful of counsel. Also, denying the
accused an opportunity to consult with an attorney prevents
the accused from obtaining evidence, such as an independent
blood alcohol test, which might help to prove innocence6' and
which opportunity would have disappeared within the four
hours62 the accused was held incommunicado. This possiblity
clearly demonstrates prejudice.63 The Supreme Court noted
the importance of counsel in combatting prejudice when it
held in Powell v. Alabama" that a person charged with a
crime "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him."'65
Although it is constitutionally permissible for the state to
force the accused to undergo chemical sobriety tests, 66 the is-
sue is not addressed in this comment because none of the
60. An example would be the right to an independent blood alcohol test.
61. It may become necessary for the defendant:
to present evidence showing that he was not under the influence of intoxicating
liquor at the time of his arrest. A most effective way to present such evidence
would be through disinterested witnesses who could observe his condition soon
after his arrest or after he had been booked for the crime, and by a blood test
administered by a doctor. The evidence of intoxication dissipates with the pas-
sage of time. The 4-hour rule imposed by the police regulation recognizes that
after 4 hours a person under the influence of intoxicating liquor will have
reached a state of sobriety ....
City of Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wash. 2d 733, _, 409 P.2d 867, 871 (1966).
62. Id.
63. Id. at _, 409 P.2d at 872.
64. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
65. Id. at 69. This has been interpreted many times as including such stages of
criminal prosecution as the "lineup" and other preliminary steps leading to further con-
duct against the defendant. Narten v. Curry, 33 Ohio Misc. 94, 291 N.E.2d 799 (1972).
"As reprehensible as operating a motor vehicle under the influence may be, surely a
person accused of such an offense is entitled to the right of counsel equally with a mur-
derer, rapist, armed robber or other perpetrator of criminal act." Id. at _, 291 N.E.2d
at 800.
66. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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states have provided for mandatory testing.67 Instead, the
states have enacted implied consent statutes68 to attain their
goals. The purpose of the mandatory revocation provision in
an implied consent statute is "[t]o encourage the suspected
drunk driver to take a blood alcohol test voluntarily. ' 69 It is
arguable that the states have acknowledged the critical nature
of the chemical sobriety testing in that they leave the defend-
ant a choice of submitting to testing or suffering the loss of
driving privileges. The choice may be rendered meaningless,
though, without the guidance of counsel at this critical stage.
The question of whether or not to take the test may, depend-
ing upon the facts and circumstances of each case, have [a]
very real bearing upon whether a person is or is not con-
victed of DWI, does or does not lose his license and suffers
the penalty of a heavy fine or jail sentence. Only an attor-
ney, with the full knowledge of the facts gained from his cli-
ent, can weigh the factors of each case and make a proper
decision. 0
III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
The second type of drunk driving case involves a civil pro-
ceeding which usually results in a noncriminal penalty, such
as the revocation of a driver's license, because the driver "re-
fused" to take a chemical sobriety test. This section will dis-
cuss what constitutes a "refusal" to take the test. An analysis
of the significance of a "civil proceeding" in light of an arres-
tee who is denied an opportunity to contact an attorney and
consequently does not take the test will follow.
67. Despite the decision in Schmerber, implied consent statutes have not been re-
pealed because to do so might threaten the receipt of highway refunds under the High-
way Safety Act. State v. Newton, 291 Or. 788, 636 P.2d 393 (1981).
Also, states have elected to give drivers the option of refusing the test in order to
avoid the potential for police abuse that might accompany physical compulsion. See
Note, supra note 21, at 941-44; see also Lerblance, supra note 4, at 47 n.22. See gener-
ally Hunvald and Zimring, Whatever Happened to Implied Consent? A Sounding, 33
Mo. L. Rav. 323 (1968).
68. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
69. Calvert v. State, Dep't of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Div., 184 Colo. 214, 217, 519
P.2d 341, 343 (1974).
70. City of Dayton v. Nugent, 25 Ohio Misc. 31, _, 265 N.E.2d 826, 832 (1970).
19861
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
A. The "Refusal"
Some courts have held that the arrestee's request to speak
to an attorney, in response to the officer's request that the ar-
restee submit to a breathalyzer test, constitutes a refusal under
the implied consent statute.7 Other courts have found a re-
fusal to take the test occurs when an arrestee is told, pursuant
to Miranda,72 of the right to counsel and then refuses to take
the test until given an opportunity to call counsel. However,
many courts have held that due to the inherent confusion 73 of
the arrestee, the refusal to take the test is reasonable and li-
cense revocation is improper.74
It seems somewhat ludicrous to hold that a request for
counsel constitutes a refusal75 since the sole reason for such a
request is to ascertain what the accused's rights are and
71. See Annot., 18 A.L.R.4TH 705, 728-34 (1982) and supplementary cases.
72. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See also Annot., 10 A.L.R.3D 974
(1966) and supplementary cases. The following is an example of part ofaMiranda-type
warning:
You have the right to consult with or obtain an attorney and have him present
with you during the questioning or any part of my investigation. Do you under-
stand that? Do you willingly waive your right to remain silent and your right to
have an attorney present with you, or the right to consult with an attorney at
this time?
Wiseman v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 726, 727, 211 N.W.2d 906, 909 (1973).
73. In determining whether an arrestee's refusal is the result of confusion, the cru-
cial factor is not the arrestee's state of mind; it is the fair meaning to be given to the
response to the demand to submit to the chemical test. See Maxsted v. Department of
Motor Vehicles, 14 Cal. App. 3d 982, 986, 92 Cal. Rptr. 579, 581-82 (1971). See supra
note 30 for an explanation of how an arrestee might become confused.
74. See State v. Severino, 56 Hawaii 378, 537 P.2d 1187 (1975); Swan v. Depart-
ment of Pub. Safety, 311 So. 2d 498 (La. App. 1975); State Dep't of Highways v.
Beckey, 291 Minn. 483, 192 N.W.2d 441 (1971); Wiseman v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 724,
211 N.W.2d 906 (1973); Muir v. Cox, 611 P.2d 384 (Utah 1980).
Other courts have rejected the contention that the accused was misled by the police
regarding the right to counsel and have upheld the suspension or revocation of the
driver's license. See McGue v. Sillas, 82 Cal. App. 3d 799, 147 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1978);
Goodman v. Orr, 19 Cal. App. 3d 845, 97 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1971); Augustino v. Colorado
Dep't of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Div., 193 Colo. 273, 565 P.2d 933 (1977).
75. At least one court has held that a request to speak to counsel constitutes a
refusal because to hold otherwise would weaken the implied consent law and make it
practically ineffective. Rusho v. Johns, 186 Neb. 131, 181 N.W.2d 448 (1970). How-
ever, the Ohio Court of Appeals in Siegwald v. Curry, 40 Ohio App. 2d 313, -, 319
N.E.2d 381, 388 (1974) held that allowing a person to call an attorney and obtain advice
would in no way emasculate the implied consent law. "On the contrary, there would
probably be fewer refusals to take tests if the advice of an attorney were secured prior to
refusal." Id.
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whether the accused should take the test.76 Hence, the more
logical rule is found in the holdings of the courts which have
concluded that there has been no refusal to take a chemical
test where the arrested person has merely requested to consult
with counsel prior to submitting to a test."
The question of whether a driver "refused" a test within
the meaning of the statute is a question of fact.78 Obviously,
there is need for the general rule requiring immediate submis-
sion and regarding any substantial delay as a refusal, 79 but the
rule must be applied with respect for an arrested person's free-
dom to communicate."0 In fact, an unjustified refusal to pro-
vide a reasonable opportunity to communicate with an
attorney would be a deprivation of the person's liberty. 1
B. The "'Civil" Proceeding
Since this is a civil proceeding revoking a governmentally
granted privilege of the right to drive, the constitutional right
to counsel, generally provided in the landmark criminal cases,
has not been extended to include this situation. 2 Therefore,
many state courts have denied a right to counsel before taking
76. Raine v. Curry, 45 Ohio App. 2d 155, 341 N.E.2d 606 (1975).
77. See Troy v. Curry, 36 Ohio Misc. 144, 303 N.E.2d 925 (1973); Narten v. Curry,
33 Ohio Misc. 94, 291 N.E.2d 799 (1972).
78. Walker v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 274 Cal. App. 2d 793, 79 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1969).
The person shall have a reasonable period of time after the request to decide whether
to take the test. What is a reasonable period of time will depend on all the facts and
circumstances of each case. As the court in Atwell v. State indicated:
The police officers are not expected to neglect their other duties and responsi-
bilities and wait indefinitely for the arrested person to decide whether he will
take the test or refuse to take the test. All that is required of the police officer is
to request that the arrested person take the test and such person has a reasonable
period of time in which to make a decision whether to take or refuse to take the
test.
35 Ohio App. 2d 221, 230, 301 N.E.2d 709, 715 (1973).
79. Most states require that a chemical sobriety test must be given within two
hours of the driver's apprehension. See, e.g., OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (Page
1982).
80. Moore v. State, Motor Vehicle Div. of Dep't of Transp., 293 Or. 715, 652 P.2d
794 (1982).
81. State v. Newton, 291 Or. 788, _, 636 P.2d 393, 406 (1981) (en bane).
82. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964).
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a chemical sobriety test.8A3 The reasoning behind these hold-
ings has been that the revocation of a license is a civil proceed-
ing and, as a corollary, the taking of a chemical test is not a
"critical stage" in a criminal prosecution.84
Although driver's license revocation proceedings have
been labeled "civil"' '85 in nature, the label should not be the
decisive factor in determining whether the accused has a right
to counsel, especially in light of the important constitutional
rights which are involved. Many states impose a severe pen-
alty for a refusal to permit testing,86 which may impose a
greater burden on the driver than conviction of the crime of
driving under the influence.8 7 For example, the revocation of
83. See Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685 (1971); Goodman
v. Orr, 19 Cal. App. 3d 845, 97 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1971); Calvert v. State Dep't of Reve-
nue, 184 Colo. 214, 519 P.2d 341 (1974); Davis v. Pope, 128 Ga. App. 791, 197 S.E.2d
861 (1973); State v. Severino, 56 Hawaii 378, 537 P.2d 1187 (1975); Mills v. Bridges, 93
Idaho 679, 471 P.2d 66 (1970); Morgan v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Safety, 227 N.W.2d 155
(Iowa 1975); Harrison v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 298 So. 2d 312 (La. App. 1974);
Curry v. Goldberg, 614 S.W.2d 318 (Mo. App. 1981); Lewis v. Nebraska State Dep't of
Motor Vehicles, 191 Neb. 704, 217 N.W.2d 177 (1974); Harlan v. State, 113 N.H. 194,
308 A.2d 856 (1973); State v. Pandoli, 109 N.J. Super. 1, 262 A.2d 41 (1970); Story v.
Hults, 19 N.Y.2d 936, 228 N.E.2d 398, 281 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1967); Agnew v. Hjelle, 216
N.W.2d 291 (N.D. 1974); Phares v. Department of Pub. Safety, 507 P.2d 1225 (Okla.
1973); Commonwealth v. Morris, 218 Pa. Super. 347, 280 A.2d 658 (1971); Blow v.
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 83 S.D. 628, 164 N.W.2d 351 (1969); State v. Del-
leveneri, 128 Vt. 85, 258 A.2d 834 (1969); Deaner v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 285, 170
S.E.2d 199 (1969); State v. Berry, 271 S.E.2d 776 (W. Va. 1980).
84. To say that the person does not have a right to contact an attorney prior to
deciding whether to take the sobriety test, because the license revocation pro-
ceeding, initiated once the test is refused, is civil in nature totally ignores the fact
that the person is in custody pursuant to an arrest on a criminal charge. The
proceedings are all criminal in nature until testing is actually refused.
Heles v. South Dakota, 530 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D. 1982), vacated as moot, 682 F.2d 201
(8th Cir. 1982). See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
"critical stage" concept.
85. Revocation proceedings have been labeled civil because they are conducted by
the commissioner of public safety in administrative proceedings and are reviewed in the
courts as such. See Prideaux v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 247 N.W.2d
385 (1976).
86. Minnesota has a one-year revocation of a driver's license. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 169.123(4) (West Supp. 1985). Such a revocation may have a devastating impact on
the driver. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
87. For example, Minnesota's drunk driving statute provides in part:
Every person convicted of a violation of this section . . . is punishable by im-
prisonment of not more than 90 days, or by a fine of not more than $500, or
both, and his driver's license shall be revoked for not less than 30 days, except
. ..when the violation is found to be the proximate cause of great bodily harm
• ..shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 90 days, or by fine of
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a driver's license for six months to a year may have an impact
on the ordinary driver as devastating as the traditional crimi-
nal sanctions of a fine and imprisonment. A driver's license is
no longer considered a luxury or mere privilege to most citi-
zens, but a prerequisite to earning a livelihood. As the United
States Supreme Court stated in Bell v. Burson:18
Once [driver's] licenses are issued,. . . their continued pos-
session may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.
Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that
adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such
cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that pro-
cedural due process required by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 9
Although the civil proceedings involving the suspension of
driving rights for a failure to take a chemical test are separate
and distinct from criminal proceedings" involving prosecu-
tion for driving while under the influence of alcohol, it may be
difficult for the accused to distinguish between the two pro-
ceedings until the accused refuses to take a chemical test and
is immersed in civil proceedings. 91 Once there has been a sub-
mission or refusal to take the test, the benefit of an attorney
becomes less meaningful since it is the decision of whether to
take or refuse the test that becomes the "critical stage." Since
the chemical test itself has apparent and serious consequences,
both civilly and criminally, the accused needs the advice and
guidance of counsel before taking the test. The decision to
refuse or submit to a chemical test will dictate whether the
accused is immersed in civil or criminal proceedings. The ac-
cused may not understand the consequences of this decision
without guidance from an attorney at the "critical stage."
The accused has critical interests at stake when confronted
with this civil/criminal dilemma. The accused could submit
to the chemical sobriety test and possibly later discover that
participation was detrimental. Alternatively, the accused
not more than $500, or both, and his driver's license shall be revoked for not less
than 90 days.
MINN. STAT. § 169.121 subd. 3 (West Supp. 1985).
88. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
89. Id. at 539 (citations omitted). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970);
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
90. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
91. Siegwald v. Curry, 40 Ohio App. 2d 313, -, 319 N.E.2d 381, 384 (1974).
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could refuse to take the test and suffer the loss of driving privi-
leges. Although a number of courts have held that there is no
right to counsel in civil proceedings, that implication must be
modified. As the court in Siegwald v. Curry indicated:
There is an inherent right to counsel as to all matters, be it
civil or criminal. In criminal matters, however, both the
Ohio and the United States Constitutions expressly provide
that a person shall not be denied this right to counsel. In
criminal matters, it must frequently and affirmatively appear
that the right to counsel has been afforded to a defendant,
and, if it does not so appear, a denial of counsel is presumed.
In civil matters, however, there is no error with respect to a
denial of counsel, unless it appears that the party expressly
requested the right to confer with counsel and was unjustifi-
ably denied the exercise of that right. The right is not abso-
lute, but may be controlled as to time and circumstances.
However, there exists a right to counsel in civil matters. 93
IV. RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN BOTH CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS AND ITS LIMITATIONS
Some courts have argued that the decision to consent to
the test is one not requiring legal expertise but simply a "yes"
or "no" answer.94 The choice, however, may be meaningful to
an individual driver. For example, the driver who is requested
to submit to chemical testing might not know that a reason-
able refusal of the test is permitted in certain circumstances
where the officer did not have reasonable grounds for arrest or
for requesting the test, did not properly disclose the driver's
rights, or confused the driver as to those rights.95 Further-
more, depending upon the individual driver's circumstances,
the decreased possibility of a criminal conviction 96 may be
92. 40 Ohio App. 2d 313, 319 N.E.2d 381 (1974). The good-faith request of a
person arrested for DWI to pursue the statutory right to call an attorney before submit-
ting to a chemical test does not constitute a refusal to take the test. Id. at -, 319
N.E.2d at 384.
93. Id. at _ 319 N.E.2d at 383-84. The court went on to say that "[a]nother
distinction is that in criminal matters a denial of counsel is usually per se prejudicial. In
civil matters, however, a denial of the right to counsel must be shown to have been
prejudicial." Id.
94. Flynt v. State, 507 P.2d 586 (Okla. 1973).
95. State, Dep't of Highways v. Beckey, 291 Minn. 483, 192 N.W.2d 441 (1971).
96. The penalty for drunk driving under Wis. STAT. § 346.65 (1983-84) is as
follows:
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worth the six months' loss of the driver's license if the driver
does not depend on a driver's license for a livelihood. If the
driver was involved in an accident resulting in death, the
driver might face serious criminal proceedings in which the
test results could be used as inculpatory evidence. The above
instances may be uncommon, but are certainly not impossible.
When such a situation does arise, a crucial and binding deci-
sion must be made regarding chemical testing which will af-
fect the driver in subsequent proceedings. This decision is just
as binding and critical as a decision regarding whether to
make a verbal statement, a decision which is zealously pro-
tected by current case law.97
Even if retained counsel advises the driver to submit to a
test, the valuable right to counsel is not wasted. An intoxi-
cated driver may be confused, dazed, or suspicious of the ar-
resting officer, not only because of possible intoxication, but
perhaps because of injury as well as other reasons. The right
to counsel is eminently fair where such access does not delay
or impair the chemical testing.98 Thus, it is apparent that the
exercise of this important right will not render implied con-
sent statutes ineffective99 where the resulting delay does not
exceed a reasonable time and will not affect the other impor-
tant consideration here-an accurate test. 100
(2) Any person violating § 346.63(1): (a) shall forfeit not less than $150 nor
more than $300. ... (b) Shall be fined not less than $300 nor more than $1,000
and imprisoned not less than 5 days nor more than 6 months if the total of
revocations. . . and convictions. . . equals 2 in a 5-year period ...
97. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
98. People v. Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d 224, 227, 239 N.E.2d 351, 352, 292 N.Y.S.2d 415,
418 (1968). Defendant possessed a number of statutory options at the station house in
which the advice of counsel, if available, was relevant. The court limited the right to
counsel in the following manner: "If the lawyer is not physically present and cannot be
reached promptly by telephone or otherwise, the defendant may be required to elect
between taking the test and submitting to revocation of his license, without the aid of
counsel." Id. at 229, 239 N.E.2d at 353, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
99. See supra note 75.
100. For an interesting discussion on the validity and accuracy of chemical testing,
see generally Feldman & Cohen, The Questionable Accuracy of Breathalyzer Tests,
TRIAL, June 1983, at 54; Kelly and Tarantino, Radio Frequency Interference and the
Breathalyzer: A Case Analysis, R.I.B. J., June 1983, at 6; Nichols, Toward a Coordi-
nated Judicial View of the Accuracy of Breath Testing Devices, 59 N.D.L. REV. 329
(1983); Spencer, Validity of Breath Test, 46 J. CRIM. L. 21 (1982).
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It has been feared that persons accused of DWI will abuse
their right to counsel in an effort to delay the administration
of the chemical sobriety test until their blood alcohol level has
significantly decreased through normal physiological
processes. 01 "Whether or not the request to consult the attor-
ney is made in good faith and whether the exercise of the right
will unreasonably delay administering the test are factual is-
sues to be determined from the facts and circumstances of
each case." 10 2 For the most part, granting a defendant's re-
quest will not substantially interfere with the investigative
procedure since the telephone call can be completed in a mat-
ter of minutes.10 3 A telephone call is all that is required since
it is not necessary for the defendant's attorney to be physically
present' at the time a chemical sobriety test is administered.
However, it is necessary that the defendant is afforded a rea-
sonable opportunity to consult with counsel prior to deciding
whether to submit to or refuse a chemical sobriety test. 0 5
In light of current recognition of the importance of coun-
sel in criminal proceedings affecting significant legal rights,
law enforcement officials may not, without justification,10 6
prevent access between the criminal accused and his lawyer,
available in person or by immediate telephone communica-
tion, if such access does not interfere unduly with the matter
at hand.' 0 7
101. The human body assimilates alcohol in the blood at a fairly rapid rate. See
Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d at -, 239 N.E.2d at 353, 292 N.Y.S.2d at -.
102. Siegwald, 40 Ohio App. 2d at -, 319 N.E.2d at 388.
103. See Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d at 228-29, 239 N.E.2d at 353, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
104. Often, telephone consultation will be sufficient to provide the defendant with
adequate legal assistance to ensure the defendant's basic rights to a fair trial. State v.
Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d 436, -, 610 P.2d 893, 900 (1980). See also supra note 98.
105. As a matter of fairness, government should not compel individuals to make
binding decisions concerning their legal rights in the involuntary absence of counsel.
See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486 (1964); People v. lanniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418,
424, 235 N.E.2d 439, 443, 288 N.Y.S.2d 462, 468 (1968); People v. Donovan, 13
N.Y.2d 148, 153, 193 N.E.2d 628, 630, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 844 (1963).
106. The police may lawfully restrict the freedom of an arrested person to com-
municate to the degree reasonably required for the performance of their duties.
For example, where the police are authorized to seize "highly evanescent evi-
dence". . . and delay caused by an attempt to call counsel would impair their
ability to effectively do so, they may require that the arrested person's exercise of
the freedom to call be deferred until after completion of the seizure.
State v. Newton, 291 Or. 788, -, 636 P.2d 393, 406 (1981) (footnote omitted).
107. Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d at -' 239 N.E.2d at 352, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
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In other words, the defendant may be required to either take
the test or suffer the loss of driving privileges without the
assistance of counsel, only if the lawyer is not physically pres-
ent and cannot be reached promptly by telephone. 10 8
Finally, it has been argued that the defendant's right to
counsel will hinder enforcement of the drunk driving statutes.
For example, the state is already required to inform the de-
fendant that the breathalyzer test need not be taken and of the
consequences of refusal. 10 9 Access to counsel will merely al-
low the defendant an opportunity to obtain advice before re-
sponding to the warning. It is contended that this is not only
a waste of time,'10 but places a needless burden on the state as
well.
However, the nature of the defendant's right to counsel
will not overburden the state. For example, the state must
merely allow the defendant an opportunity to immediately
contact counsel. The state is not required to ensure that the
defendant is placed in face-to-face contact with counsel, nor is
the state required to select an attorney for the defendant.1
The United States Supreme Court has firmly established
that the sixth amendment and fourteenth amendment right to
counsel attaches only at or after the initiation of adversary
The privilege of consulting with counsel concerning the exercise of legal rights
should not, however, extend so far as to palpably impair or nullify the statutory
procedure requiring drivers to choose between taking the test or losing their
licenses. It is common knowledge that the human body dissipates alcohol rap-
idly. . . . Where the defendant wishes only to telephone his lawyer or consult
with a lawyer present in the station house or immediately available there, no
danger of delay is posed. But, to be sure, there can be no recognition of an
absolute right to refuse the test until a lawyer reaches the scene.
Id. at -, 239 N.E.2d at 353, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
108. Id. See also Finocchiaro v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 58, 61, 181 N.E.2d 427,429,226
N.Y.S.2d 403, 405 (1962) (Van Voorhis, J., concurring).
109. See supra note 31.
110. See supra note 107 and accompanying text for a discussion of the importance
of the time factor.
111. Fitzsimmons, 92 Wash. 2d at -, 610 P.2d at 899. Although a criminal de-
fendant's right to counsel in most other circumstances will require the state to ensure
that the defendant is advised by an attorney in person, that is not the case here, where
"[t]he unique nature of the offense of driving while under the influence and the circum-
stances under which the defendant is likely to be arrested and charged both create the
constitutional right and limit the type of effort the state must make to avoid violating
that right." Id. at _, 610 P.2d at 900. See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974) (extent of procedural protection constitutionally required varies with the nature
of the individual's interest and the factual context in which the interest is asserted).
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judicial proceedings against the accused.1 12 However, as this
section has pointed out, an arrested person's access to legal
advice on a critical choice, such as whether to submit to the
sobriety test, is of vital importance, especially in this instance
where there is no undue burden placed on the state1 3 and no
possibility of impairing the test.1 14
V. OTHER GROUNDS FOR THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Some courts have been reluctant to rest their decision con-
cerning the right to counsel on sixth amendment grounds. In-
stead, they have based their decision on the fourteenth
amendment, '1 5 fifth amendment,"16 or the state's own statu-
tory provisions governing the right and access to counsel. 117
A. Fourteenth Amendment-Due Process
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is an
established source of a right to counsel independent of the
sixth amendment where the right to counsel is critically im-
portant to the fairness of the proceedings." 8 Consequently,
some courts have examined the proceedings to see if they meet
the due process requirement of fundamental fairness, espe-
cially where the early stages of the controversy are similar to
criminal proceedings. The United States Supreme Court has
held that "consideration of what procedures due process [in-
volves] may require. . . a determination. . . of the govern-
ment function involved as well as of the private interest that
112. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); White v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
113. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
115. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution forbids states to
"deprive any person of. . .liberty. . . without due process of law .. " U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
116. See infra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377 (1968); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). See generally Grano, Kirby, Biggers,
and Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting
the Innocent?, 72 MICH. L. REv. 719, 742-52 (1974).
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has been affected by governmental action."11 9 The personal
interests of the arrestee were addressed by the court in State v.
Newton12 0 when it held that denial of a defendant's request for
an opportunity to phone an attorney is a violation of the privi-
lege of access to counsel under the fourteenth amendment.121
The court's analysis in Newton specifically addressed the
right of an arrestee to call an attorney before deciding whether
to submit to a breathalyzer test under the Implied Consent
Law. 122 The plurality opinion stated:
Defendant's freedom to call a lawyer before deciding to sub-
mit to breathalyzer testing was not safeguarded in this situa-
tion by the Sixth or Fourth Amendments, but, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, his freedom to do so could not be
foreclosed or deferred unless the police were authorized to
do so. Defendant's liberty to communicate as he chose was
to be free from 'purposeless restraints', but subject to lawful
restraints. 12
3
A second due process argument can be utilized in states
which statutorily provide that the arrestee can have an addi-
tional chemical test performed by a physician of personal
choice.12 4  These state courts recognize that the bodily
processes will, within a short time, reduce the blood alcohol
level to the point where an untimely blood test will be of little
probative value of the accused's condition. 125 Incommunicado
119. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
120. 291 Or. 788, 636 P.2d 393 (1981) (en banc).
121. Id. See also People v. Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d 224, _ 239 N.E.2d 351, 352-53, 292
N.Y.S.2d 416, - (1968).
122. Although there are four opinions in Newton, all of them recognize the right of
an arrestee to call an attorney, although their rationales differ.
123. Newton, 291 Or. at 806-07, 636 P.2d at 406. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961) for the Supreme Court's discussion of due process upon which the Newton court
relied.
The police may lawfully restrict the freedom of an arrested person to communicate
to the degree reasonably necessary for the performance of their duties. An example of
this is where the police are authorized to seize "highly evanescent evidence." See State
v. Heintz, 286 Or. 239, 248, 594 P.2d 385, 390 (1979).
124. Kansas has a statute in this area which provides:
Without limiting or affecting the provisions of K.S.A. 8-1001 to 8-1003, the per-
son tested shall have a reasonable opportunity to have an additional chemical
test by a physician of his or her own choosing. In case the officer refuses to
permit such additional chemical test to be taken, then the original test shall not
be competent in evidence.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1004 (1982).
125. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
1986]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
detention under such circumstances violates due process be-
cause it amounts to a suppression of potentially exculpatory
evidence. 12
6
A third due process argument is based on the necessity of
a driver's license. The continuous possession of a driver's li-
cense, as the Supreme Court has noted, may become essential
to earning a livelihood; therefore, it is an entitlement which
cannot be taken without the due process mandated by the
fourteenth amendment. 1
27
In the landmark case of Powell v. Alabama,128 the Supreme
Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment requires that a person accused of a crime be pro-
vided with "the guidance of counsel at every step in the pro-
ceedings against him." 129  Consequently, some courts have
held that a person apprehended for drunk driving has a due
process right to communicate with counsel before deciding
whether to submit to a chemical test. 130 Other courts have
held to the contrary.13 1
Whichever of the above three approaches is adopted, it is
clear that to unreasonably deny an arrestee's requested right
of access to counsel offends a sense of justice which impairs
126. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The following cases hold that while
the state is not required to provide the accused with a blood test, it may not unreasona-
bly prevent the accused from attempting to obtain one at his or her own expense: State
v. Munsey, 152 Me. 148, 127 A.2d 79 (1956); People v. Burton, 13 Mich. App. 203, 163
N.W.2d 823 (1968); Scarborough v. State, 261 So. 2d 475 (Miss. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 946 (1973); State v. Snipes, 478 S.W.2d 299 (Mo. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 979
(1972); State v. Johnson, 87 N.J. Super. 195, 208 A.2d 444 (1965); Harlan v. State, 430
S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); City of Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wash. 2d 733, 409
P.2d 867 (1966).
127. See Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
128. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
129. Id. at 69.
In sum, the principle ofPowell v. Alabama and succeeding cases requires that
we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to determine whether the
presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right to a
fair trial as affected by his right to meaningfully cross-examine the witnesses
against him and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself. It calls
upon us to analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights
inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid
that prejudice.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 227 (emphasis in the original).
130. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
131. See Gottschalk v. Sueppel, 140 N.W.2d 866 (Iowa 1966); State v. Jones, 457
A.2d 1116 (Me. 1983); State v. Braunesreither, 276 N.W.2d 139 (S.D. 1979).
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the fundamental fairness of the proceeding. Thus, there is a
strong argument that the due process requirement of funda-
mental fairness 132 requires that the defendant be allowed to
phone an attorney. This fairness factor tips the scales of jus-
tice in favor of the individual when weighing the individual
interest against the governmental interest referred to in the
beginning of this section. 133
B. Fifth Amendment-Self-Incrimination
Some defendants have argued that evidence of a motorist's
refusal to take a sobriety test is a violation of the privilege
against self-incrimination 134 and, therefore, is inadmisible. 135
However, it has recently been decided that neither the intro-
duction of the results of a chemical sobriety test, nor the re-
fusal to submit thereto, violates the fifth amendment
prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination.1 36  In
Schmerber v. California,1 37 the Court said:
We hold that the privilege [against self-incrimination as con-
tained in the fifth amendment of the Constitution] protects
an accused only from being compelled to testify against him-
self, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testi-
monial or communicative nature, and that the withdrawal of
blood and use of the analysis in question in this case did not
involve compulsion to these ends.1 38
132. "[D]ue process," unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with
a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. Expressing as it does
in its ultimate analysis respect enforced by law for that feeling ofjust treatment
which has been evolved through centuries of Anglo-American constitutional his-
tory and civilization. . . [due process] [r]epresent[s] a profound attitude offair-
ness between man and man, and more particularly between the individual and
government ....
Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
133. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
134. U.S. CONsT. amend. V provides in part: "No person shall.., be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. .. ."
135. See generally Phipps, Constitutional Law-Self-incrimination-Cautionl Re-
fusal to Take a Blood-Alcohol Test May Be Hazardous to Your Trial, 12 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 167 (1984).
136. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966).
137. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
138. Id. at 761 (footnote omitted).
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Hence, most jurisdictions have held that refusal evidence
does not violate the fifth amendment and, therefore, is admis-
sible. 139 This conclusion is based on one of two different ratio-
nales: (1) that a refusal is nontestimonial and; (2) that a
refusal is not compelled."4 A few states, however, have con-
cluded that the evidence is inadmissible.14 1
C. Statutory Grounds-Right to Counsel
Some courts have not based their decision on the right to
counsel on constitutional grounds, 4 2 but rather have based it
on their own implied consent statute and their general statu-
tory provisions governing the right to counsel. 143 Therefore,
some courts have held, in the cases involving a criminal pen-
alty, that the defendant has a right to counsel based on state
statutes which pertain to the right to counsel. In City of Day-
ton v. Nugent,'" the court, in part, relied upon the state stat-
ute 45 providing for the right to counsel:
After the arrest, detention, or any other taking into custody
of a person,14 6 with or without a warrant, such person shall
139. See Annot., 26 A.L.R.4A 1112 (1983) and supplementary cases.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 383 and supplementary cases.
142. Arguments for the right to counsel have been advanced on the basis of the
sixth amendment, fifth amendment, and fourteenth amendment. See Annot., 18
A.L.R.4T 705 (1982).
143. See, eg., State v. Vietor, 261 N.W.2d 828 (Iowa 1978). Other courts have
based their decisions on both constitutional and statutory grounds. See, e.g., State v.
Hill, 277 N.C. 547, 178 S.E.2d 462 (1971); Dayton v. Nugent, 25 Ohio Misc. 31, 265
N.E.2d 826 (1970); State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d 436, 610 P.2d 893 (1980).
Wis. STAT. § 946.75 (1984-85) also provides for a general right to counsel. How-
ever, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that "[t]he obligations of a driver under
the implied consent law are entirely independent and unrelated to the general statutory
right to counsel." State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 191, 200, 289 N.W.2d 828, 833 (1980).
Wisconsin's implied consent law does not mention the right to counsel prior to
chemical testing. Since the implied consent law is more recent and more specific than
the general statutory right to counsel, it is controlling on the issue of the right to coun-
sel prior to deciding whether to submit to chemical testing. Id.
144. 25 Ohio Misc. 31, 265 N.E.2d 826 (1970) (person arrested for drunken driving
had a sixth amendment constitutional and statutory right to consult with an attorney
prior to deciding whether to submit to the chemical test).
145. The language of this statute is typical of many state statutes which provide for
the right to counsel. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 804.20 (West 1979); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-501 (1983).
146. No distinction is made in Ohio Revised Code Section 2935.20 between felonies
and misdemeanors or between different types of crimes within each classification.
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be permitted forthwith" facilities to communicate with an
attorney at law of his choice. . . or to communicate with
any other person of his choice for the purpose of obtaining
counsel. Such communication may be made by a reasonable
number of telephone calls or in any other reasonable man-
ner. Such person shall have a right to be visited immediately
by any attorney at law so obtained. . . and to consult with
him privately. No officer. . . shall prevent, attempt to pre-
vent, or advise such person against the communication, visit,
or consultation provided for by this section. 4 8
Thus, in states which statutorily provide for the right to coun-
sel, the police department must afford an arrestee, arrested for
any type of crime, 149 the immediate150 opportunity to commu-
nicate with an attorney.
A number of courts have held that there is a statutory
right to counsel before deciding whether to take or refuse a
chemical test under implied consent procedures. 151 Of course,
there can be no doubt that, "[o]ne who is detained by police
officers under a charge of driving under the influence of an
intoxicant has the same constitutional and statutory rights as
any other accused."1 52
However, as Gursey5 3 pointed out, the right to counsel is
not absolute. It must be balanced against the practical consid-
eration that a chemical test is to be administered within two
hours of the time of arrest or not at all.154 Assuming that the
test is taken within two hours, and the evidence obtained is
sufficient to convict the accused, 155 the accused may still pre-
vail if the right to counsel was improperly' 56 refused since the
147. "Forthwith," by definition, means "immediately." BLACK'S LAw DICTION-
ARY 588 (5th ed. 1979).
148. Dayton, 25 Ohio Misc. at _, 265 N.E.2d at 831 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2935.20) (emphasis added by Dayton court).
149. See supra note 146.
150. See supra note 147.
151. See Gooch v. Spradling, 523 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); People v. Gur-
sey, 22 N.Y.2d 224, 239 N.E.2d 351, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1968); Siegwald v. Curry, 40
Ohio App. 2d 313, 319 N.E.2d 381 (1974).
152. State v. Morris, 275 N.C. 50, 165 S.E.2d 245 (1969).
153. 22 N.Y.2d at 229, 239 N.E.2d at 353, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
154. See, ag., IOWA CODE ANN. § 321B.4 (West 1984).
155. See supra note 22.
156. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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remedy provided for by a statutory or constitutional right to
counsel is to render the evidence obtained inadmissible. 157
VI. CONCLUSION
Society's view of drinking drivers is reflected in the laws
enacted in an attempt to curtail their activities. '58 Undoubt-
edly, the drinking driver is a valid concern in today's soci-
ety. 15 9  Yet, in attempting to inhibit the drinking driver,' 6°
society and its laws should not neglect the rights and protec-
tions afforded those accused of crimes.
The implied consent statute gives a choice to the ac-
cused. 16 1  The word "choice" implies an opportunity to
choose: the power to choose between alternatives.' 62 How-
ever, some courts have rendered that choice meaningless by
refusing to allow a right to counsel, 163 thereby leaving the mis-
informed or uninformed driver no choice at all.
Once a driver is arrested for DWI and makes a decision on
whether to submit to a chemical sobriety test, to a large extent
the driver's guilt or innocence is determined. While society's
need for prosecuting drunk drivers is important, its needs are
not abridged, in any significant way, by permitting the ac-
157. See, e.g., State v. Vietor, 261 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Iowa 1978). This rule has also
been applied to evidence of a refusal to take the test. See generally Annot., 18
A.L.R.4TH 705 (1982) and supplementary cases.
158. The obvious and intended effect of the implied consent law is to coerce the
driver into consenting to chemical testing thereby allowing scientific evidence of blood
alcohol content to be used against the driver in a subsequent prosecution for DWI.
State Dep't of Highways v. Schlief, 289 Minn. 461, 463, 185 N.W.2d 274, 275 (1971).
See also supra note 6.
159. See generally Quade, supra note I.
160. There can be no question that a driver's license is a valuable asset and an
important privilege, but one which includes responsibility. This certainly includes the
responsibility not to drive while impaired or intoxicated, and a penalty must be imposed
if that is the case.
161. One court stated that the legislature saw fit to provide an agonizing choice for
one accused of drunk driving. However, the legislation does allow an arrestee the op-
portunity to reasonably refuse to take the test. This deliberate legislative alternative
takes on significance when one considers that the legislature could have constitutionally
set forth the requirement that every person arrested for DWI take a sobriety test. See
Hall v. Secretary of State, 60 Mich. App. 431, 231 N.W.2d 396 (1975).
162. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 260 (una-
bridged ed. 1969).
163. See supra note 83.
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cused, within reasonable bounds, 16 to have counsel present at
this critical stage. In essence, there is no harm in allowing the
accused a reasonable opportunity to consult with an attorney
as to whether or not to submit to the test. The accused, of
course, must act reasonably and cannot be allowed to abuse
the right in a manner which would unduly delay or unreason-
ably interfere with the administration of the test.
This comment has examined numerous cases which have
held in favor of the driver's right to counsel. Some cases in-
volved the right to counsel when the accused was facing a
criminal prosecution for DWI. Others held the right valid in
license revocation proceedings before an administrative tribu-
nal. Although constitutional grounds were a predominant
reason for the holdings, some of the courts rejected the consti-
tutional grounds and relied instead on state statutes or court
rules. Despite these factual and legal differences, these cases
support a single, unifying idea: that one accused of DWI has
a right to consult with an attorney prior to deciding whether
to submit to a chemical sobriety test. Having compared the
opposing cases holding against a right to counsel, it is appar-
ent that the cases in favor of the individual's right to counsel
possess the more compelling logic and express the fairer rule.
LAURIE A. MLSNA
164. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
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